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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The statement of issues set forth in Appellant's brief
is unnecessarily repetitious*

The sole issue before this Court

on appeal is:
Did Appellant's Lis Pendens, which contained a
street address and a legal description of one
of the two parcels now claimed by Appellant,
provide constructive notice of Appellant's
claim to an interest in the parcel of property
for which no legal description was given in
the Lis Pendens.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HANS C. RILLING,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 860499
vs.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, and KAY M.
LEWIS, ESQ., Trustee,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL CORPORATION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent First Security Financial Corporation (hereinafter "First Security") does not dispute Appellant Hans C.
Rilling's (hereinafter "Rilling") Statement of the Case and
adopts that statement by reference herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rilling's Statement of Facts contains several factual
misstatements.
1.

Those misstatements are as follows:
The property at issue in this litigation consists

of two parcels located in Ogden, Utah.

The legal descriptions of

these two parcels of property are as follows:
Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden City,
Weber County, Utah: Beginning on the East
line of Fillmore Avenue, 280.81 feet South 58'
East of 28th Street; thence South 89°2'East
150 feet; thence North 58' West 10 feet;
thence North 59°29'40" West 172.41 feet, more
or less, to Fillmore Avenue; thence South 58'
West to beginning. (Hereinafter Parcel "A.")

Also, a Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden
City, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at a
point 480 feet North 0°58' East from the
Southwest corner of said Block 4, and running
thence North 0°58' 120 feet along the East
side of Fillmore Avenue; thence South 89°02'
East 280.89 feet; thence South 0°58' West 120
feet; thence North 89°02' West 280.89 feet to
the place of beginning. Situated in the
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 34, Township 6 North, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake City Meridian, U.S. Survey. [R.5758.] (Hereinafter Parcel "B.")
2.

Paragraph 2 of Rillingfs Statement of Facts pro-

vides the legal description of both parcels of property at issue
in this appeal.

Rilling identifies the first parcel as Parcel A

and indicates that it is the larger parcel of property, the
parcel not identified in Rilling's Lis Pendens.

In fact, the

first parcel described above (Parcel A) is the smaller of the two
parcels, and a legal description of that parcel is set forth in
Rilling's Lis Pendens.
Rilling's Brief).]

[Record at 18 (attached as Exhibit "A" to

Conversely, the second parcel of property

described above, identified in this and in Rilling's Brief as
Parcel B, is the larger of the two parcels. No legal description
of this parcel is contained in Rilling's Lis Pendens.

[Record at

18.]
3.

Paragraph 5 of Rilling's Statement of Facts notes

that his Lis Pendens contained a legal description of the smaller
parcel of property, Parcel A.
tifies that parcel as Parcel B.

Rilling again erroneously idenWhile Rilling notes in that same

paragraph 5 that the Lis Pendens referred to an attached valuation notice, "also setting forth the legal description" of the

property, Rilling omits to note that no such Valuation Notice was
attached to the Lis Pendens as recorded.
4.

[See Record at 18-19.]

Rilling fails to note that it is undisputed

that

First Security had no actual knowledge or notice of Rilling1s Lis
Pendens or of any claim by Rilling to any interest in Parcel B
when First Security made a loan secured by an interest in Parcel
B to Marsha Rilling.

[Record at 76-77.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

First Security does not dispute

the

priority

of

Rilling f s interest in Parcel A of the property, by virtue of the
priority of the recordation of Rilling's Lis Pendens.

No issue

is before the Court as to the rights of the parties in Parcel A.
Likewise, it is undisputed that First Security was unaware of
Rilling's Lis Pendens and of any claim by Rilling to any interest
in Parcel B when First Security made its loan.

Thus, the issues

before the Court are concerned solely with whether Rilling's Lis
Pendens gave First Security constructive notice of a claim by
Rilling to an interest in Parcel B.
Because Rilling's Lis Pendens does not describe Parcel
B it provided no notice of any claim by Rilling to any interest
in Parcel B.
priority.

As to Parcel B, the lien of First Security has

Utah statute requires that a recorded

instrument

contain a legal description of the property affected
instrument.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10.

by the

Rilling's Lis Pendens,

which contained a legal description of only Parcel A, provided
notice of a claim by Rilling only as to that parcel of property.

Because the Lis Pendens contained no legal description of and
provided no notice, actual or constructive, of Rilling1s claim to
Parcel B, Rilling1 s claim to that parcel is subordinate to that
of First Security.
It is undisputed that First Security was unaware of
Rillingfs Lis Pendens when First Security made its loan to Marsha
Rilling.

Rilling's theory that his Lis Pendens should have

alerted First Security to sufficient facts to cause it to inquire
further is, thusf based on an erroneous factual premise.

Because

First Security had no knowledge of the Lis Pendens, the Lis
Pendens could not have alerted First Security to any facts.
Thus, the sole issue before this Court on the undisputed facts of
this case is whether Rilling's Lis Pendens provided

First

Security constructive notice of a claim by Rilling to an interest
in Parcel B.
Moreover, even had First Security been aware of the Lis
Pendens, that document does not contain any facts that would have
alerted First Security to Rilling's undisclosed claim to a parcel
of property not described in the Lis Pendens.

In this respect,

the holding of the Washington Supreme Court in Koch v. Swanson,
481 P.2d 915 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971), is directly analogous, and
the trial court correctly applied and relied on that case.
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The Colorado Court of

Appeals has likewise held that:

QX-

The recording of documents constitutes
constructive notice only if it is so provided
by statute. . . . Further, there must be
strict compliance with the provisions of the
statute, ordinance or regulation for such
notice to be effective. . . . If the applicable statute or ordinance is not strictly
followed, constructive notice cannot be imputed to anyone.

Arapahoe Land Title, Inc. v. Contract Financing, Ltd., 472 P. 2d
754, 755-56 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970)(cites omitted). ^A ;
Strict adherence to statutory recordation requirements
is essential to the functioning of the land recordation system.
The recordation system provides a convenient and inexpensive way
for those claiming interests in land to provide the public with
notice of those interests, and for the public to ascertain the
ownership of particular parcels of land.

The system works,

however, only if the public can rely on the contents of recorded
documents as accurate statements of the interests claimed.

Thus,

recorded instruments are uniformly deemed to provide constructive
notice only of their own contents and of other documents referred
to by them.

E.g., Caito v. United California Bank, 576 P.2d 466,

470 (Cal. 1978).
The Lis Pendens recorded by Rilling on May 11, 1983
recites that the real property affected by the Lis Pendens is
located at 2810 Fillmore Avenue, Ogden, Utah.
then provides a legal description of Parcel A.
Parcel B is set forth in the Lis Pendens.
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A11 instruments executed after Ju1y 1, 1 961
which release or assign a mortgage, deed of
trust, lease or other documents creating a
lien or encumbrance on real property, shall
not be entitled to recordation in the office
of any county recorder unless said instruments
contain a legal description of the real property affected thereby. All county recorders
shall refuse to accept the same for recording
until said real property description is inserted .

• s*

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10 (emphasis added.)

An amendment to this

section effective July 1, 1983 f did not alter the relevant requirement that a recorded instrument must contain a legal description of the property affected by the instrument.
Ann. § 57-3-10 (1986).

Utah Code

Rilling's Lis Pendens, which purported to

create a lien against the property in favor of Rilling, was,
thus, subject to the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10 that
it contain a legal description of the property affected by the
Lis Pendens.
Section 57-3-10 specifies that documents that do not
contain a legal description of the property affected shall not be
recorded.

That provision did

not bar the recordation of

Rilling's Lis Pendens, however, because the Lis Pendens contained
a legal description of Parcel A.

The county recorder therefore

received Rilling's Lis Pendens and entered the Lis Pendens in the
abstract showing the chain of title of Parcel A.
82.]

[Record at

But the recorder had no way of knowing that Rilling also

asserted a claim against Parcel B, property that was not described in the Lis Pendens.

Thus the Lis Pendens was not entered

in and does not appear in the abstract showing the chain of title
as to Parcel B.

[Record at 82.]

Rilling's Lis Pendens simply

gave neither the county recorder nor any other party notice of
any claim by Rilling of an interest in Parcel B, because the Lis
Pendens did not comply with Section 57-3-10.
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specify

the types of indices which a county recorder's office must maintain.

Among these indices is an abstract record:
which shall show by tracts or parcels every
conveyance or encumbrance, or other instrument
recorded, the date and character of the instrument , time of filing the same, and the
book and page and entry number where the same
is recorded, which record shall be kept so as
to show a true chain of title to each tract or
parcel and the encumbrances thereon as shown
by the records of the office.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6 (1973).

In the present case, First

Security could only have identified who owned or claimed to own
an interest in Parcel B by examining the abstract index.

None of

the other statutorily required indices under Utah Code Ann. § 1721-6 would have identified a "true chain of title to each tract
or parcel."
An abstract record, however, is and must be organized
according to the legal description of the property contained in
the instruments of record.

Thus, the statutory requirement of

section 57-3-10 that a recorded document contain a legal description of the property affected is essential to the recordation
system.

Only that requirement allows the recorder to maintain

the statutorily mandated abstract index "showing a true chain of
title" to property.

The present case clearly illustrates the

importance of these principles.

Because Rillingfs Lis Pendens

did not comply with section 57-3-10, the recorder was unaware
that Rilling asserted any claim to Parcel B.

The Lis Pendens,

thus, was not recorded in and does not appear in the chain of
title to Parcel B.
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noted:
It also seems obvious to us that the purpose
of the statutes authorizing the recording of
the instruments of conveyance is to impart to
a subsequent purchaser notice of instruments
which affect the title to a specific tract of
land in which the subsequent purchaser is
interested at the time. From a reading of all
of the statutory provisions together, we have
concluded that the legislature intended that
recorded instruments of conveyance, to impart
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser
or mortgagee, should describe the land conveyed with sufficient specificity so that the
specific land conveyed can be identified. As
noted above, K.S.A. 58-2203 and 58-2204 require a deed to describe the premises. A
description of the property conveyed should be
considered s u fficie n t i f it i d e n t i f i e s th e

property or affords the means of identification within the instrument itself or by
specific reference to other instruments recorded in the office the register of deeds.
Such a specific description of the property
conveyed is required in order to impart constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser.
Luthi v. Evans, 576 P.2d at 1070j

The court in Luth carefully

noted, however, that a "Mother Hubbard" clause could be deemed a
sufficient description of the property conveyed for purposes
other than recordation.

Thus, as between the parties to the

instrument, a "Mother Hubbard" clause "is valid, enforceable, and
effectively transfers the entire property interest."

Luth v.

Evans, 576 P.2d at 1070.
In the present case, Utah's recording
reveal the same purpose as those of Kansas.

act

statutes

Utah's statutes

require that documents be recorded "so as to show a true chain of
title to each tract or parcel."

Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6.

This

Court should find, as did the court in Luth, that achievement of
that purpose requires that recorded documents contain a legal
description of the property affected by the documents.
Because Rilling's Lis Pendens does not properly describe
any claim by Rilling to an interest in Parcel B and does not
appear in the record chain of title to that parcel, it provides
no constructive notice of any claim by Rilling to that parcel.
See Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 48 P. 2d 480, 483-84
(Utah 1935) (bank which held an equitable lien against 2.75 acre
tract was not entitled to priority over subsequent purchaser of
the tract where "there is nothing on the record which could give

notice to third persons.")

As the Colorado Court of Appeals has

noted:
[I]nterested parties with no actual or constructive notice of prior conveyances or
encumbrances may rely on and are bound by the
recorded history of the title.
Grynberg v.

City of Northglenn, 703 P.2d 601, 602-03 (Ct. App.

Colo. 1985).

See 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 99

("A person in dealing with another in respect to real estatef may
rely on the record title to the property, in the absence of
actual knowledge of the title in fact, or of facts sufficient to
put him on inquiry in respect thereto.").
Rilling's first argument that his Lis Pendens satisfies
Utah's recordation requirements in describing the property by
means of a street address is untenable.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10

clearly requires that recorded instruments contain a legal description of the property affected by those instruments.

That

requirement is essential to the functioning of the public record
system, because only such legal descriptions can provide a basis
for indexing and searching the public records.
II.

FIRST SECURITY WAS NOT ALERTED TO FACTS THAT SHOULD
HAVE CAUSED IT TO HAVE DISCOVERED RILLING'S CLAIM.
Rilling next argues that his Lis Pendens contained

sufficient facts to have caused First Security to inquire further
and to have discovered Rilling's claim to Parcel B, even if the
Lis Pendens does not comply with the Utah statutory requirements
by providing a legal description of Parcel B.

Rilling's Lis

Pendens could have alerted First Security to facts calling for
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further inquiry, however, only if First Security had known of the
Lis Pendens.

It is undisputed that First Security had no actual

knowledge of Rilling's Lis Pendens when First Security made its
loan to Marsha Rilling.

[Record at 76.]

Thus, the only issue

before this Court is whether Rilling's Lis Pendens provided First
Security with constructive notice of Rilling1s claim to Parcel B.
As set forth above, Rilling's Lis Pendens did not provide any
such constructive notice.
Even if it is assumed that First Security was aware of
Rilling's Lis Pendens, however, the Lis Pendens does not contain
any facts that should have caused First Security to inquire
beyond the face of the recorded Lis Pendens.

Rilling bases his

claim that his Lis Pendens created a duty of further inquiry on
what he advances as the "general rule" that a recorded instrument
may place the public on notice of a claim if it contains sufficient facts to "suggest further inquiry."

[Brief of Appellant at

11.1
Rilling fails to cite, however, the equally general rule
that the principle of inquiry notice is limited by the rule that:
[T]he record is notice only so far as the land
is correctly described, unless it is apparent
from the record itself that there is a misdescription.
66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 143. This limitation
on the scope of inquiry notice recognizes that correct property
descriptions are essential to functioning of the entire recorda-

tion system, and that the requirement of correct property descriptions simply cannot be waived.

Apart from the fact that

principles of inquiry notice are not applicable to this case,
because inquiry notice extends only insofar as the property has
been correctly described, however , Rilling cannot show that his
Lis Pendens placed First Security on inquiry notice as to any
claim by Rilling to an interest in Parcel B.
Rilling bases his claim of inquiry notice on three
facts:

First f he argues the property "was used in its entirety

as a single family residence"; secondf his Lis Pendens contained
the street address of the entire property; and, third, "Hans and
Marsha Rilling were involved in a divorce proceeding."
Appellant, at 13.]

[Brief of

None of these facts could provide First

Security with any notice of a claim by Rilling to an interest in
a parcel of property not described in the Lis Pendens.
The alleged fact that the two parcels of property at
2810 Fillmore Avenue "was used in its entirety as a single family
residence" simply does not appear anywhere, directly or by inference, in the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens merely provides a
street address and a metes and bounds description of a certain
parcel of real property, Parcel A.

The Lis Pendens says nothing

of the use of the property, improvements on the property, or the
nature of the property.
Moreover, information as to the prior use of property
affords little by way of prediction regarding its future use.
Family farms that have been held and used as a single tract for

generations are regularly partitioned.

A duplex used as a single

family residence may be divided into separate tracts*

In a

divorce, the husband may acquire title to a garage where he has a
shop or conducts his business at family home, while the wife
acquires title to the home.

The fact that Parcels A and B had

been held in common would, in no respect, preclude a decree
partitioning the property.

Any prior use of the- property stands

outside the facts disclosed by an examination of record, and
provides no basis for questioning the description of property
claimed by Rilling in his Lis Pendens.
The fact that Hans and Marsha Rilling were engaged in
divorce proceedings, likewise, provided First Security with no
notice that the property description set forth in Rilling's Lis
Pendens was in error.

There is no rationale means by which First

Security could have gone from the fact of the divorce proceedings
to the conclusion that Rilling must have claimed an interest in
property other than that described in the Lis Pendens.
Finally, Rilling argues that his Lis Pendens contains
the street address for both parcels of property and that the
street address should have alerted First Security to Rilling's
claim to an interest in both parcels.

It should be noted, first,

that it is unclear whether the street address given in Rilling's
Lis Pendens identifies both parcels of the property in any relevant sense.

Speculation that someone examining only the street

address set forth in the Lis Pendens, might have wondered about
the extent of property claimed under the Lis Pendens, does no

more than emphasize the inadequacy of street addresses for purposes of recordation and determining the notice imparted by
recorded documents.
The legal description for Parcel A set forth

in

Rilling1s Lis Pendens, however, eliminated any basis for doubt as
to the property claimed by Rilling in the Lis Pendens*

The fact

that Rilling provided an accurate and complete description of
Parcel A in the Lis Pendens negates any inference that he asserted some unarticulated claim against any other property.

As

this Court has previously held, consistent with longstanding
common law principles, where a conveyance contains both a legal

*

description of the property conveyed and a more general description, the specific legal description controls in the event of any
conflict or uncertainty.
(Utah 1979).

/? 9fr^L
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Neeley v^ Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 982 J*^
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In sum,

by Rilling would
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fond the face of

Rillingfs Lis Pendens. Thus, First Security acquired an interest
in Parcel B without notice of any claim by Rilling to an interest
in that property.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED AND ADOPTED THE
HOLDING OF KOCH V. SWAN5QN.

Rilling finally argues that the trial court misapplied
the holding of the Washington Court of Appeals in the case of
Koc h v^ S w a n son , 481 P.2d 915 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).

Kochy

however, does no more than reiterate certain fundamental statutory and common law principles regarding the recordation system.
First, Koch stands for the principle that property must be correctly and accurately described in a recorded instrument in order
for notice to be given of a party's interest in that parcel of
property.

Second, Koch stands for the principle that where a

parcel of property that actually exists is described in a recorded instrument, the instrument provides no notice that other
or different property may also be claimed under the instrument.
Stated differently, where an actually existing parcel of property
is described in a recorded instrument, the public is not placed
on notice or duty of inquiry that the instrument affects property
other than the property described in the instrument.
Koch is, however, particularly relevant to this case
because of its factual similarity to the present case.

In Koch,

the Swansons mortgaged property to plaintiffs, the Kochs, described as:
The West 196.96 feet of the north 1-1/2 of
Tract 125 of Opportunity, except the South 169
2/3 feet thereof. . . .
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 916.

The Kochs' trust deed was

properly recorded on June 30, 1965.

The Swansons, however, owned

no interest in tract 125; instead, they owned tract 124. On July
7, 1965, the Swansons mortgaged a parcel of property, to Pacific
First Federal described as:
The West 186.96 feet of the North half of
Tract 124 of Opportunity, as per plat thereof
recorded in Volume "K" of Plats, page 20
except THE SOUTH 169 2/3 RODS FEET THEREOF. .
• •

Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 916.

The mortgage in favor of

Pacific First Federal was recorded a week after the Kochs'
mortgage.
The Kochs initiated an action to foreclose on their
mortgage, alleging that their lien was prior to that of Pacific
First Federal.

It was the Kochs1 theory against Pacific First

Federal that:
[S]ince the only difference in description in
the several conveyances is with respect to
tract number, such similarities should have
excited inquiry on the part of [Pacific First
Federal] leading to discovery of the error in
description and thus knowledge of plaintiffs'
mortgage.
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 917.

In rejecting this argument and

in holding that the Kochs' recorded mortgage provided no constructive or inquiry notice as to any claim by the Kochs to an
interest in Tract 124, the Washington court relied on the general
principle that property must be correctly described in order to
provide inquiry or constructive notice.

The court held that:

Where existing property is described, the
index and the recorded document imparts notice
only as to matters within its chain of title
. . . . Therefore, one searching the index
has a right to rely upon what the index and
recorded document discloses and is not bound

to search the record outside the chain of
title of the property presently being conveyed.
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 917 (cites omitted).
To the same effect is Lake Louise Marie Community Assoc.
v. Lake Louise Marie Corp., 266 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1966), where the
court held that a lis pendens that did not accurately describe
the property subject to litigation failed to provide constructive
notice.

Similarly, in Dorsch v. Jenkins, 365 A. 2d 861, 863-64

(Pa, Super. Ct. 1976), the court held that a property description
identifying only the address of property was defective and prevented a lis pendens from providing constructive notice.
Koch is factually analogous to this case and the trial
court correctly applied the principles of Koch in deciding this
case.

As in Koch, Rilling's Lis Pendens described a parcel of

property that actually exists, Parcel A.

Rilling's Lis Pendens

was recorded, in conformity with Utah's recordation statutes, in
the chain of title to Parcel A; but the Lis Pendens does not
appear in the chain of title as to Parcel B.

Rilling's

Lis

Pendens, therefore, provided inquiry and constructive notice as
to Rilling's claim to an interest in Parcel A.

The Lis Pendens

did not, however, provide any notice or raise any duty of inquiry
with respect to Parcel B, for inquiry notice does not arise where
a recorded instrument correctly describes existing property.
As the Washington court noted in Koch the argument of
the Koch's, and in this case of Rilling, that the public could

not rely on property descriptions set forth in recorded instruments,
would impose an almost impossible burden upon
a party seeking to become a bona fide purchaser in that each and every conveyance shown
of record involving a common grantor would
have to be investigated beyond the auditor's
records for possible error to avoid a claim of
inquiry notice. This would destroy the
strength of our recording system and any
justifiable reliance thereon.
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 917-18.

Such a holding in this case

would have a similar effect on Utah's recordation system.
Rilling's Lis Pendens must, therefore, be held to have raised no
inquiry notice regarding any claim by Rilling to property other
than Parcel A, which was described in the Lis Pendens.
CONCLUSION
First Security had no actual knowledge of Rilling's Lis
Pendens, so the only issue before this Court is whether that Lis
Pendens gave constructive notice of Rilling's claim to an interest in Parcel B.

Under Utah law, a street address is not a

t

sufficient description of property for recording purposes.
Rilling's Lis Pendens, which provided a legal description of
Parcel A, provided constructive notice of Rilling's claim to that
parcel only.

Because no legal description of Parcel B appears in

the Lis Pendens and because the Lis Pendens does not appear in
the record chain of title to Parcel B, it provides no constructive notice of any claim by Rilling to an interest in Parcel B.
No facts set forth in Rilling's Lis Pendens could have
alerted First Security to any claim by Rilling to Parcel B or

have caused First Security

to make

inquiry f

Security was unaware of the Lis Pendens.

because

First

Even had First Security

been aware of the Lis Pendensf however, nothing in that document
should have caused First Security to inquire further.

Because

Rilling f s Lis Pendens described an existing parcel of property,
Parcel A f

the Lis Pendens created no duty of inquiry as to any

claim Rilling might have to other property.
Because First Security had no constructive or inquiry
notice regarding any claim by Rilling to Parcel B the trial court
correctly ruled that the lien of First Security is superior to
any claim by Rilling to Parcel B.
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